Duquesne Law Review
Volume 47

Number 2

Article 10

2009

Kentucky's Lethal Injection Protocol Satisfies the Eighth
Amendment's Prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishment:

Baze v. Rees
John P. Cawley

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John P. Cawley, Kentucky's Lethal Injection Protocol Satisfies the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition against
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Baze v. Rees, 47 Duq. L. Rev. 413 (2009).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol47/iss2/10

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Kentucky's Lethal Injection Protocol Satisfies the
Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: Baze v. Rees
John P. Cawley, M.D.*
EIGHTH AMENDMENT -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT

-

DEATH

PENALTY -

CRUEL AND

METHOD

OF

EXECUTION - The United States Supreme Court found that the
risk of improper administration of Kentucky's method of execution
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because it does
not impose an objectively intolerable risk to the condemned inmate.
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
Petitioners, Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling, were independently sentenced to death after each was separately convicted
of double homicide.' The Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently
upheld their convictions and sentences on direct appeal. 2 Baze
and Bowling then sued state officials in the Franklin Circuit Court
for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, attempting to have Kentucky's lethal injection protocol declared unconstitutional on the
basis that the procedures utilized would present them with an un3
necessary risk of harm.

* J.D. Candidate, Duquesne University School of Law (Class of 2010); M.D., Georgetown University School of Medicine (1992); S.M., Harvard University (2003); B.S., Indiana
University of Pennsylvania (1987).
1. Baze v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 965 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1997), affid, 217
S.W.3d 207, 207-12 (Ky. 2006); Bowling v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 873 S.W.2d 175,
176 (Ky. 1993), aff'd, 217 S.W.3d 207, 207-12 (Ky. 2006).
2. Baze v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 965 S.W.2d 817, 829 (Ky. 1997); Bowling v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 873 S.W.2d 175, 182 (Ky. 1993). The defendants' then sought
a declaratory judgment action against Kentucky's prison officials alleging that the Commonwealth's method of execution protocol was cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment. Baze v. Rees, 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Jul. 8,
2005), affd, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006). The Franklin Circuit Court denied relief. Id. The
inmates appealed. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1521 (2008).
3. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Ky. 2006) (hereinafter "Baze f'). This was the
first case of Baze v. Rees heard in the Kentucky Supreme Court on appeal from the Franklin Circuit Court. Id.
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After Kentucky adopted lethal injection as a method of execution, the Commonwealth's Department of Corrections formulated
4
a written protocol to comply with the statutory requirements.
The protocol outlines the sequential intravenous administration of
three drugs. 5 The initial drug, sodium thiopental (Pentathol), is a
6
fast-acting barbiturate sedative that induces unconsciousness.
The second drug is pancuronium bromide (Pavulon), a paralytic
agent that inhibits all voluntary muscle movement, including respiration. 7 The final drug, potassium chloride, stops the heart by
interfering with the cardiac electrical impulses and causing a cardiac arrest.8 In addition, Kentucky's protocol features several inherent safeguards, including the requirements (1) that intravenous (IV) catheters be initiated only by qualified emergency medical technicians (EMTs) or phlebotomists having a minimum of
twelve months of proficiency; (2) that both a primary and an alternative IV site be successfully established prior to the start of
the execution procedure; (3) that both the warden and deputy
warden be present in the execution chamber with the prisoner to
observe the IV site for potential problems, including infiltration;
and (4) that the warden orders the flow of chemicals to be redirected to the backup IV site if the prisoner does not lose consciousness within one minute after the thiopental is administered.9
Throughout the proceedings, all parties agreed that the condemned inmates would experience a painless death if Kentucky's
lethal injection protocol were properly implemented. 10 The petitioners were concerned, however, that a risk existed that the protocol might be improperly administered and that unnecessary,
excruciating pain would result. 1 Accordingly, petitioners claimed
that this risk was a violation of their Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. 12 In turn, they argued
that, when reviewing the constitutionality of the method of execution, the court must consider the followings factors: (1) the inten-

4.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (2006).

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (2006).
10. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537 (2008) (hereinafter "Baze I'). This was the
Baze v.Rees case to which the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
11. BazelI, 128S. Ct. at 1530.
12. Baze 1, 217 S.W.3d at 209.
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sity of the pain, (2) the chance of that pain occurring, and (3) the
availability of possible alternative means. 13 The Commonwealth
responded by arguing that the petitioners' proposed minimal-risk
standard would force states to engage in a constant review of the
constitutionality of their method of execution to rebut each and
every novel argument presented by a defendant in a capital case. 14
After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the procedure, finding
that there was only a minimal risk of the improper implementation of the method of execution and that such minimal risk was
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment because it did not create
a substantial likelihood that pain would occur. 15 On appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court
declaring that a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only when it "creates a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death." 16 Baze
and Bowling then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari to decide whether Kentucky's method of
17
execution complies with the Eighth Amendment.
The petitioners' claim depended upon the inappropriate administration of the initial drug.18 Both parties conceded that failing to
effectively administer an adequate dose of thiopental to render the
prisoner unconscious creates a significant risk of suffocation from
the subsequent administration of pancuronium bromide and that
this situation would rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.1 9 Additionally, petitioners contended that numerous aspects of the lethal injection protocol permitted opportunities for
error.20 Petitioners claimed that the Commonwealth could, in the
13.
14.
15.

Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.
Id.
Id. The bench trial lasted a week with numerous witnesses and experts testifying.

Id.
16. Baze 1,217 S.W.3d at 209 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
17. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.
18. Id. at 1533.
19. Id.
20. Id. Petitioners alleged the following risks are inherent in Kentucky's lethal injection protocol: (1) that the thiopental will not be satisfactorily administered to achieve its
necessary sedative effect; (2) that further monitoring by experienced personnel is necessary
to ensure that thiopental has been adequately administered; (3) that the Commonwealth's
adoption of a one drug protocol which eliminates the use of pancuronium and potassium
would also eliminate any potential risk of pain; (4) that the thiopental would be improperly
prepared because Kentucky uses unqualified personnel to reconstitute a sufficiently effective dose; (5) that the IV line will not be properly inserted causing the first drug to be ineffectively administered; (6) that infiltration of the drugs would go unrecognized because the
personnel are not medically trained; (7) that pancuronium serves no therapeutic purpose
while eliminating muscle contractions and potentially masking pain and suffering; and (8)
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alternative, adopt a one-drug protocol, using a single dose of bar21
biturate.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the plurality opinion, 22 noting
first that the United States Supreme Court has never declared a
state's method of execution as violative of the Eighth Amendment. 23 To determine the historical basis for the inclusion of the
Eighth Amendment in the Constitution, the Chief Justice cited
Wilkerson v. Utah,24 which examined several cases from England
involving the sanctioning of cruel and unusual punishment during
26
executions. 25 In addition, several other cases were also reviewed.
After this analysis, the plurality concluded that, traditionally, the
essential elements that constituted a method of execution as cruel
"involved torture or a lingering death."27 The Court explained further that, to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the
methods used by the Commonwealth must be likely to cause
"needless suffering' 28 and rise to a level of "sufficiently imminent
29
dangers."
Chief Justice Roberts then stressed the incongruity of announcing lethal injection as "objectively intolerable" 30 when it is, in fact,
31
tolerated by thirty-six states, as well as the federal government.
Furthermore, he observed that the vast majority of states used the
same three-drug protocol as Kentucky and that no state uses the
alternative one-drug protocol suggested by petitioners. 32 The plurality then noted that neither isolated mistakes nor the mere potential for pain during an execution renders it "objectively intoler-

that the protocol lacks any comprehensive mechanism for monitoring the depth of the inmate's sedation. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-36.
21. Id. at 1534.
22. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1525. The plurality opinion was joined by Justice Kennedy
and Justice Alito. Id.
23. Id. at 1530.
24. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
25. Baze H, 128 S. Ct. at 1530 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)) (upholding
a death sentence imposed by firing squad).
26. Id. at 1530-31. The Supreme Court cited In re Kemmler where the court rejected an
Eighth Amendment challenge to execution by electrocution. Id. (citing In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890)). The Court also cited Louisiana ex rel. Francisv. Resweber where a plurality upheld a second attempt at executing a prisoner by electrocution after the first attempt
was unsuccessful due to mechanical failure. Id. (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
27. Id. at 1530.
28. Id. at 1531.
29. Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)).
30. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
31. Id. at 1532. As of 2009, only 35 states have the death penalty. Id.
32. Id.
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able." 33 Thus, a convict is unable to legally challenge a state's execution procedure by simply demonstrating a minimally safer alternative that would reduce or eliminate insubstantial risks of
pain.3 4 Adopting the petitioners' unworkable standard, the Court
reasoned, would convert the judiciary into review boards responsible for characterizing and prescribing optimal guidelines for executions, with each opinion superseded by another round of litigation espousing an innovative or allegedly improved contextual
analysis. 35 Rather, the suggested alternatives must be practical,
readily enforceable, and adequately address a "substantial risk of
serious harm" 36 that can be significantly reduced; the petitioners'
proposed methods, which served to lessen only minimal risks,
37
failed to meet these threshold requirements.
Moreover, the Chief Justice rebutted the dissent's belief that
examining the inmate for consciousness by saying his name, stroking his eyelashes, or furnishing him with a potent noxious stimulus could effectively lessen the risks associated with the administration of the subsequent drugs before the thiopental achieved its
sedative effect.38 This alleged danger, the plurality declared, is
already mitigated because Kentucky's protocol has structured procedural safeguards to ensure the adequate administration of the
thiopental. 39 Notably, the plurality asserted, the scheme the dissent postulates involves the inmate achieving a level of unconsciousness described as adequate to elude detection of the improper administration of the thiopental but not sufficient enough
to prevent harm. 40 There is no intimation that any of these proposed additional tests could realistically characterize that distinc4
tion. 1
Accordingly, the plurality held that Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol complies with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment 42 because what that amendment forbids is the malicious or
unjustifiable exposure to "objectively intolerable risk."43 The risks
of improper administration alleged by petitioners cannot be char33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1531.
Id.
Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1531.
Id. at 1532.
Id.
Id. at 1536.
Id.
Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1536.
Id.
Id. at 1538.
Id. at 1537 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
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acterized as rationally unendurable, nor can they be recognized as
proof of the deliberate imposition of an "objectively intolerable
risk. '44 Consequently, the Court concluded that a prisoner will not
succeed on an Eighth Amendment challenge by merely demonstrating an additional step the State could implement to insure
other independently sufficient processes, and it rejected petitioners' proposed "unnecessary risk" standard, as well as the dissent's
"untoward risk" analysis. 45
Justice Alito's concurring opinion focused on considerations of
objections to lethal injection protocols within the milieu of practical restraints and the ethical rules of medical professionals. 46 He
opined that a challenge to a method of execution should be supported by a majority of scientific opinion, and only then, if a state
declined to amend its method in light of such evidence, would that
state's action be equivalent to conditions that the Court has, on
prior rulings, determined to be violative of the Cruel and Unusual
47
Punishments Clause.
The thrust of petitioners' main argument was that Kentucky's
procedure violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to employ a
one-drug protocol; petitioners cited expert testimony presented to
the trial court justifying that a three-gram dose of barbiturate
would cause death within several minutes. 48 Justice Alito observed, however, that there is not widespread belief in the accuracy of that declaration. 49 Additionally, there is published advice
against adopting this single drug protocol by the medical community in the Netherlands, where physician assisted suicide is legal. 50 Justice Alito then contrasted this finding with the recom44. Id.
45. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1537.
46. Id. at 1538-42 (Alito, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 1540. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
48. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1541.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Robert D. Troug, Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and ExecutionsHighlightsfrom a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 448 (2008)). Paraphrasing Dr. Robert D. Troug, Professor of Medical Ethics and Anesthesiology at Harvard
Medical School: many experts have stated that several grams of barbiturate are completely
lethal. Id. In this country, however, we do not have a lot of experience with these dosages.
Id. In Holland, where euthanasia is legal, we reviewed 535 cases of euthanasia from a
study in 2000. Id. In 69% of those cases, a paralytic was given. Id. I think what the Dutch
realize is that it's actually quite difficult to kill a person with just a large dose of barbiturate. Baze II, 128 S.Ct. at 1541 (citing Robert D. Troug, Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Executions-Highlightsfrom a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 448 (2008)). Additionally, they reported that in 6% of those cases, where a single
drug was given, there were problems with completion. Id. And in five of those instances, the
patient actually woke up from their barbiturate induced coma. Id.
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mendation from the Royal Dutch Society for the Advancement of
Pharmacy, 51 and he concluded that governmental action regarding
capital punishment cannot be prompted by the attestations of a
single expert or by judicial interpretations based on such affirmations.52
Justice Alito emphasized that the controversy over the constitutionality of the method of execution presented here should remain
53
distinct from the disputatious issue of capital punishment itself.
He further articulated that the Court should not construct a de
facto moratorium on the death penalty by embracing "method-of54
execution rules" that prohibit the mobilization of litigation.
The concurring opinion written by Justice Breyer cited a 2005
Lancet article, its subsequent rebuttal,5 5 as well as an article that
appeared in the 2002 edition of the Ohio State Law Journal.56 He
addressed petitioners' contention that the use of pancuronium to
euthanize animals is contradictory to standards of veterinary
practice in the United States, and its use for human euthanasia is
57
encouraged in the Netherlands.
While Justice Breyer agreed that the pertinent elements of the
"degree of risk," the "magnitude of pain," and the "availability of
alternatives" are complementary and that each factor must be
evaluated, he simultaneously concluded that the virtue of the legal
51. Id. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring). Pancuronium is recommended as part of a euthanasia protocol by the Royal Dutch Society for the Advancement of Pharmacy. Id.
52. Id. at 1541-42.
53. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1542.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1564 (Breyer, J., concurring). An article by Dr. Leonidas G. Koniaris and
others was published in the April 16, 2005 issue of Lancet where the authors reviewed
toxicology autopsy results from 49 executions in various states. Leonidas G. Koniaris, et al.,
Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005). This
study focused on the efficacy of the barbiturate in sedating the condemned. Id. It reported
that several states used 2 grams of thiopental (Kentucky uses 3 grams) which was several
times the dose given in routine surgical procedures. Id. The researchers noted that the
level of barbiturate measured from the blood hours after death was less than the level
expected during surgery. Id. They asserted that 43% of the specimens had barbiturate
concentrations compatible with consciousness. Id. But this study may be significantly
misleading; in its issue from September 24, 2005, the Lancet published several rebuttals to
this data explaining that a barbiturate can readily diffuse from the blood into adjacent
tissues after death. Jonathan I. Groner, Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for
Execution, 366 LANCET 1073 (2005).
56. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1565 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Deborah W. Denno, When
Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution
and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63 (2002)). Professor
Denno analyzed lethal injection execution data from three dozen states that use thiopental.
Id. She reported 31 executions occurring over a 25 year period where there was some type
of problem or difficulty noted during the procedure. Id.
57. Id. at 1565-66.
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issue commenced must ultimately hinge upon the proof presented. 58 He found inadequate evidence in both the transcript and
in the pertinent literature that the Commonwealth's execution
59
method represents a "significant risk of unnecessary suffering."
Joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas authored an opinion
concurring only in the Court's judgment and took the position that
"a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is
deliberately designed to inflict pain."60 He briefly explored the
history of capital punishment 61 and determined that the Court has
defined the characteristics of exacerbated forms of the death penalty as those which would threaten and oppress the felonious and
were constructed to "inflict pain and suffering" beyond that which
62
is required for death.
Justice Thomas believed that the Court has consistently interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause according to
the original intention of the Framers: "to prohibit torturous modes
of punishment akin to those that formed the historical backdrop of
the Eighth Amendment." 63 Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated
that the Court has never implied that, under an Eighth Amendment analysis, a method of execution is deemed to be cruel and
unusual merely because it associated with some risk of pain, regardless of whether that risk is "substantial," "unnecessary," "untoward," or amendable to mitigation through surrogate procedures.64 He additionally opined that the standard the Court has
unambiguously inferred is that the Eighth Amendment forbids the
65
"intentional infliction of gratuitous pain."
Within the emulous paradigms articulated by the plurality and
the dissent, the only difference, according to Justice Thomas, between a method of execution that conforms to the Eighth Amendment and one that does not may be determined by something as

58. Id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1556-57. Hanging was the usual means of execution. Id. at
1556. However, a death sentence could be intensified by other methods such as burning at
the stake, hanging the prisoner in a metal enclosure and allowing the body to decompose
publicly, beheading, and disemboweling. Id. at 1556-57.
62. Id. at 1557-58.
63. Id. at 1559.
64. Id. at 1560.
65. Id. at 1560. No analogous inquiry of death by firing squad versus hanging was
required in Wilkerson. Id. In addition, the Court did not exam the particular procedures
used by a firing squad in order to ascertain whether or not they involved risks of pain that
could be mollified by implementing variant protocols. Id.
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innocuous as the stroking an eyelash. 66 He avowed that the Court
has neither the sovereignty nor the proficiency to regulate the
states' implementation of the capital punishment with such a con67
suetude.
Consequently, Justice Thomas rebuffed as both unorthodox and
impracticable any archetype necessitating that the courts harmo68
nize the utility and handicaps of different methods of execution.
Instead, he would circumscribe the Court to weighing only
whether the challenged method was axiomatic in exposing the inmate to "significantly more pain than traditional modes of execu69
tion."
Justice Thomas reiterated that the Commonwealth's lethal injection protocol will result in a precipitous and pain-free death if
properly administered. 70 Accordingly, the challenge that the Kentucky's pain-avoidance procedure might inadvertently fall short
because the executioners may error during administration, does
not rise to the level that would support an Eighth Amendment
claim. 71 Therefore, Thomas concluded, the petitioners' argument
must fail because "Kentucky's lethal injection protocol is designed

to eliminate pain rather than to inflict

it."72

Justice Stevens authored an additional concurring opinion focusing on the use of pancuronium, the constitutionality of the
three-drug protocol, and the justification for the death penalty
itself.73 He also observed that pancuronium establishes a risk that
the condemned will suffer agonizing pain prior to death.7 4 Because of such potential risk, a consensus exists among veterinarians in the United States that the use of the drug should be prohibited for animal euthanasia. 75 Moreover, the use of pancuronium
was especially alarming to Justice Stevens because, in this case,
66. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1562.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1563.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Baze H, 128 S. Ct. at 1563 (citing Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 907 (Tenn.
2007)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1542-52 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1543.
75. Id. (citing The 2000 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia,218 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 669, 680 (2001)). The 2000 Report of the American Veterinary Medical
Association (AVMA) Panel on Euthanasia asserted that it is not appropriate practice to
combine a neuromuscular blocking agent with pentobarbital for use in animal euthanasia.
Id. at 1543 n.1. Several states, including Kentucky, have prohibited this practice through
legislation. Id. at 1543.
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the trial court found that it "served no therapeutic purpose." 76
Consequently, he stated, it is not medically necessary that the
Commonwealth use pancuronium in the protocol when it is subsequently followed by potassium chloride, which will stop the in77
mate's heart and cause imminent death.
In his analysis, Justice Stevens cited Gregg v. Georgia,78 and he
explained that, unless a criminal punishment occasions a valid
penological action, it comprises "a gratuitous infliction of suffering" violative of the Eighth Amendment. 79 He observed, at that
time, the Court had identified three societal purposes for sentencing an inmate to death: "deterrence," "incapacitation," and "retribution. ' 80 He stated that our society has incrementally moved
away from distasteful retribution towards more compassionate
forms of capital punishment. 8 1 However, by demanding that an
execution be virtually painless, society inevitably safeguards the
inmate from enduring any penalty that is commensurate with the
82
anguish imposed upon his victim.
He continued that the Court's previous treatment of this issue
indicates that a sanction may be "cruel and unusual because it is
excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." 83 Justice Stevens noted that Supreme Court cases holding certain sanctions as
excessive-and therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment"relied heavily on 'objective criteria,' such as legislative enact76. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1543. According to the state trial court, pancuronium inhibits
involuntary muscle movements during the procedure and causes the cessation of respiration. Id. at 1535.
77. Id. at 1544-45. There is no national recommendation of the use of pancuronium
that deserves any unique deference. Id. at 1544. Most legislators have not specifically
enacted legislation endorsing the use of pancuronium. Id. Justice Stevens is convinced
that in those states where the issue was specifically addressed, they were formulaic or the
product of legislative accommodation, rather than a cautious resolution of pertinent deliberations. Id. at 1545.
78. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
79. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1546-47 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183).
80. Id. at 1547. Incapacitation, which may have been rational in 1976, is no longer
justifiable because current laws provide for life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Id. Recent opinions intimate that support for the death penalty wanes when presented with the alternative of life without the possibility of parole. Note, A Matter of Life
and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 1838, 1864 (2006). In spite of three decades of research, there remains no decisive
statistical evidence that the death penalty inhibits criminals. Mocan & Gittings, Getting
Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect if Capital Punishment, 46
J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003). Retribution remains as the foremost rationale for prescribing the
death penalty. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1547.
81. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1548.
82. Id. This progression actually attenuates the very hypothesis on which public support of the retribution rationale is positioned. Id.
83. Id. at 1549 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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ments." 4 However, in those opinions, he observed, the Court acknowledged that objective evidence is not completely determinative of the controversy because the Constitution envisages that the
Court's own judgment will be inextricably linked to the examination of the capital punishment question under the Eighth
85
Amendment.
Justice Stevens was also uneasy with the rules that would divest a defendant of a trial by impartial jurors representing a fair
nonpartisan segment of the populace.8 6 He asserted that disputes
concerning jury challenges were really just a process of acquiring
a tendentious "death qualified" jury.8 7 Accordingly, Justice Stevens opined, any chance of executing innocent defendants can be
completely mitigated by holding the death penalty as unconstitu88
tional.
However, Justice Stevens also observed that the Court has asserted that the death penalty is constitutional and further opined
that the Court has an established foundation for assessing the
constitutionality of this method of execution.8 9 Respecting those
precedents, Justice Stevens declared that the unavailing evidence
submitted by petitioners could not prove that Kentucky's method
of execution violated the Eighth Amendment, and he reluctantly
agreed with the plurality. 90
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion was written in direct response to Justice Stevens's concurring opinion. 91 Finding that the
very text of the Constitution recognizes that the capital punish84. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits not only torturous penalties but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that mandatory
penalties may be cruel); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that The
Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, as punishment
for an offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that death is an excessive
sanction for a mentally retarded defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for the crime of raping a 16 year old
girl); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding the death penalty not applicable to a
murderer who did not intend to kill his victim)).
85. Id. at 1549-50.
86. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1550.
87. Id. at 1550. There is an inference that the death penalty would be infrequently
issued by 12 randomly chosen jurors. Id. Justice Stevens argues that such a presumption
supports the conclusions that the death penalty is extreme. Id.
88. Id. at 1551. Justice Stevens reflected on his own judicial experience in concluding
that the constraint of the death penalty represented the groundless termination of life with
negligible contributions to any tangible social scheme. Id. (citing Furman,408 U.S. at 312)
(White, J., concurring)).
89. Id. at 1552.
90. Id.
91. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1552-56 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ment is a legitimate legislative option, Justice Scalia argued that
Justice Stevens's inferences were insupportable within the meaning of the Constitution. 92 Additionally, Justice Scalia asserted
that it is the legislature, elected through the democratic process,
rather than judiciary that decides what constitutes a meaningful
93
contribution to society.
Moreover, Scalia reasoned that the Fifth Amendment demands
a presentment or indictment by a grand jury to charge an individual with a capital offense and it prohibits the taking of life without
due process of law. 94 Justice Scalia further commented that the
same Congress that contemplated the Eighth Amendment also
promulgated the Act of April 30, 1790, 95 which made several violations punishable by execution. 96 In addition, Justice Scalia asserted that no judicial authority supported the theory that the
charge of death penalty was unconstitutional other than Furman
v. Georgia,9 7 which established a moratorium on the death penalty
that ended four years later in Gregg with the very assistance of
98
Justice Stevens.
Justice Scalia opined that legal execution may be the befitting
punitive measure in extreme cases as an assertion by the community that certain crimes are so horrendous that the only reasonable response is the imposition of the death penalty. 99 In addition,
he declared that the societal value of capital punishment, as a deterrent to crime, is a multifaceted factual issue deciphered best by
the legislatures, who can appraise the results of statistical studies
10 0
with a type of flexibility that is unavailable to the judiciary.
Justice Scalia also noted that, according to Justice Stevens, the
death penalty promotes no societal purpose because it is allegedly
neither preventative nor retributive. 10 In interpreting the Constitution, Justice Scalia felt that it is was not the Court's prerogative
02
to adopt "one set of responsible empirical studies over another."'
92. Id. at 1552.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
95. 1 STAT. 112, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1790). This act prescribed the sentence of death
for treasonous acts against the United States. Id.
96. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 1 STAT. 112).
97. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
98. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1552-53 (Scalia, J., concurring). The people have decided that
there is sufficient contribution to society from the death penalty and that judgment should
not be disturbed by unelected judges. Id.
99. Id. at 1554 (citing Gregg, 428 U. S. at 184).
100. Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
101. Id. at 1553.
102. Id. at 1554.
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Moreover, he opined that the Court should not require that state
legislatures justify their criminal penalties with infallible research
10 3
rather than realistic forecasts regarding human comportment.
Justice Scalia asserted that Justice Stevens relied on his own experience in concluding that the death penalty is unconstitutional. 104 According to Justice Scalia, this conclusion is a quintes10 5
sential expression of "rule by judicial fiat."'
Justice Ginsburg's dissent 10 6 declared that the constitutionality
of Kentucky's execution procedure hinged on whether prisoners
are sufficiently anesthetized by the sodium thiopental. 0 7 She concluded that Kentucky's protocol lacked the basic safeguards implemented by other states to confirm the prisoner's unconscious08
ness prior to the injection of the subsequent drugs.
In addition, Justice Ginsberg reviewed the Court's prior cases
and found that no concise definitive legal standard had emerged
"for determining the constitutionality of a method of execution."10 9
Moreover, she articulated that "the age of the opinions" limited
their appropriateness for resolving the present-day dispute because the Eighth Amendment must be analyzed in relation to the
maturing standards of a society. 110 She drew further analysis
from more recent judicial decisions."'
While Justice Ginsberg was in agreement with the plurality regarding the issues under consideration, she disagreed with Chief
Justice Roberts to the extent that his significant risk test established a threshold for the first of the factors, arguing instead that
103. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1554.
104. Id. at 1555.
105. Id. Legislatures and the Congress are inattentive and react out of habit rather
than truly deliberating. Id. Research in support of a deterrent effect for the death penalty
is minimized. Id. Those that support capital punishment are characterized as vengeful.
Id. Justice Stevens' experience predominates over all other considerations. Id.
106. Id. at 1567-72 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined the opinion. Id.
107. Id. at 1567.
108. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1567. "[O]ther States have adopted safeguards not contained
in Kentucky's protocol." Id. at 1570. Florida pauses between injections to ascertain unconscious in the prisoner. Id. (citing Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So.2d 326, 346 (Fla.
2007)). Kentucky's protocol does not include any such measure, or any other tests to determine whether the inmate is properly sedated Id. at 1569. There is no touching of the inmate or calling his name. Id. In Missouri, the prisoner must be examined to confirm unconsciousness. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1571 (quoting Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1083
(8th Cir. 2007)). In California, the inmate's eyelashes are stroked. Id. In Alabama, the
inmate's name is called. Id. In Indiana, the injection site is inspected after the thiopental
is administered. Id. Ammonia tablets are then used to gauge a response. Id.
109. Id. at 1568.
110. Id. at 1568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002)).
111. Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153). Death penalty sentencing may not be imposed
in any manner which is considered arbitrary and capricious. Id.
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the three factors of risk, pain, and alternatives are interdependent
and a major emphasis on one reduces the consequence of the others. 112 Additionally, Justice Ginsberg asserted that the decisive
factor is "whether a feasible alternative exists." 1 3 As infrequent
as errors may occur, the consequences of a mistake regarding the
prisoner's consciousness are appalling and effectively rendered
indiscernible after the injection of pancuronium." 4 She noted
that, if readily available measures can objectively increase the
probability that the protocol will be painless, then a state that refuses to implement such measures fails to conform to the modern
standards of decency."1 5 Justice Ginsberg would have remanded
the case with instructions to consider whether the failure to implement the readily available protective measures, confirming unconscious after the injection of sodium thiopental, "creates an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary
pain."116
Over the last several decades, commentators have categorized
the Eighth Amendment limitations into five broad interrelated
types: (I) means of punishment, (II)
proportionality, (III) power to
criminalize, (IV) conditions of confinement, and (V) procedural due
process."17 Since the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court decided only three cases under Category I that
dealt specifically with the constitutionality of a method of execution.'1 8 Moreover, in these early cases, the constitutionality of the
death penalty itself was not at issue. 119

I. MEANS OF PUNISHMENT (METHOD OF EXECUTION)
In Wilkerson v. Utah, 20 the Court held that a firing squad, as a
mode of enforcing the death penalty, was not cruel and unusual

112. Id.
113. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1569. The plurality articulates that proof of an alternative
which demonstrates only a slight improvement in safety is inadequate. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. These additional steps provide some degree of assurance that the first drug,
thiopental, has been administered properly. Id at 1571. They are simple tasks to employ
and increase the perception that the inmate will not be subjected to unnecessary pain and
suffering. Id. Kentucky did not explain why it failed to adopt any of these basic tests. Id.
116. Id. at 1572.
117. Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?,82 IOwA L.
REV. 319, 329 (1996-97).
118. Baze I, 128 S. Ct. at 1530-31.
119. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170.
120. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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punishment forbidden by the Constitution. 12 1 In In re Kemmler,122
the Court asserted that the decision of the highest court of New
York, upholding death by electricity as not a cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Constitution, was not examinable by the Supreme Court. 123 Subsequently, in Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 124 the Court ruled that carrying out an
execution of a convicted inmate after the first execution attempt
failed because of mechanical defects in the electric chair would not
constitute double jeopardy amounting to a denial of due process
nor constitute cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment. 125
II. PROPORTIONALITY
In Trop v. Dulles,126 Chief Justice Warren declared that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment should be determined by the
current standards of decency. 127 In addition, the penalty imposed
must comport with the "dignity of man."'128 This interpretation
means that "the punishment must not involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain"'129 and that it "must not be grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime" for which the defen130
dant was convicted.

121. Id. at 134-35.
122. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
123. Id. The death penalty prescribed by Laws N.Y. 1888, c.489 provided that "punishment of death must in every case be inflicted by causing to pass through the body of the
convicted a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death." Id.
124. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). Petitioner Willie Francis was properly convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. Id. On May 3, 1946, he was placed in the electric chair of the
State of Louisiana. Id. When the executioner threw the switch, death did not result, presumably due to some mechanical problem. Id. He was then returned to prison and a new
death warrant was issued for May 9, 1946. Id. Resweber was the Sheriff of the Parish of
St. Martin, La. Louisianaex. rel. Francis,329 U.S. at 459. A suit ex rel. is typically brought
by the government upon the application of a private party (called a relator)who is interested in the matter. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 603 (8th ed. 2004).
125. Id. at 463.
126. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Albert Trop had lost his citizenship after being convicted of
wartime desertion. Id. If a statute imposes a restriction for punishment purposes it is
considered to be penal. Id. at 96. A nonpenal statute would be aimed at other legislative
purposes. Id. The Court had to decide if the Constitution permitted Congress to use a
criminal punishment to strip an individual of his citizenship. Id. at 99. The Court found
that Congress could not punish in this manner. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.
127. Id. at 101.
128. Id. at 100.
129. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972)).
130. Id. (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
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Examined under this proportionality analysis, two types of
power were limited. 13 1 First, the legislature's power to authorize
the death penalty as a punishment for a nonfatal crime, such as
rape, was curtailed. 132 Second, the legislature's power to promulgate capital punishment for a particular category of defendant,
such as the insane or juvenile offenders, was similarly re33
stricted.
III. POWER TO CRIMINALIZE
Before its 1962 incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was discussed in only nine cases in the Supreme Court. 34
The substantive limits of the power to criminalize under the
Eighth Amendment were articulated in Robinson v. California,35
where the Court held a state statute criminalizing the status of
being a drug addict as unconstitutional. Additionally, in Powell v.
Texas, 136 the Court articulated that the "entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior,
which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus."'137
131. Denno, supra note 117, at 330.
132. Id. (citing Margret J. Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death: Evolving Standardsfor
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 997 (1978)). See also
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-600 (1977) (announcing that a sentence of death for the
crime of rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment
forbidden by Eighth Amendment).
133. Denno, supra note 117, at 330 (citing Radin, supra note 132, at 993); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-10 (1985) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits state
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 821-38 (1988) (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited
execution of defendant convicted of first-degree murder for offense committed when defendant was 15 years old).
134. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962). These cases include: Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947);
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); and Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866)). In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), the
question was raised but not decided. As a Federal question, it has always been ruled that
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did not apply to the States. O'Neil, 144
U.S. at 332 (citing Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall. 475, (1866)).
135. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
136. 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
137. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968). There, the Supreme Court held that
conviction for public drunkenness of one who was to some degree compelled to drink did not
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CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Later cases focused on the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the prisoner's claims of cruel confinement. 138 In Gates v.
Collier,139 prison inmates sued, arguing that a Mississippi prison's
administrative, maintenance, and operating practices-as well as
prison conditions themselves-were unconstitutional. 140 The Fifth
Circuit held that prisoners were entitled to relief under the Eighth
Amendment when they proved threats to their personal safety
from exposed electrical wiring, the mingling of inmates with serious contagious diseases, and deficient firefighting measures. 4 1 In
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,142
the Court asserted that when the State takes a prisoner into its
custody, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for the inmate's general well-being
143
and safety.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 44 the Court ruled that accidental or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care to an inmate
would not be violative of the Eighth Amendment, but deliberate
indifference to significant medical requirements of prisoners
would constitute the gratuitous infliction of pain contrary to the
45
contemporary standards of decency.
Notably, in Wilson v. Seiter, 46 the Court declared that prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims regarding their confinement required an inquiry into the prison official's state of mind. 47 In Hel-

amount to cruel and unusual punishment because he was able to stay off the streets on the
occasion in question. Id.
138. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
139. Gates, 501 F.2d at 1291.
140. Id. Moreover, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the Court stated that it
was cruel and unusual punishment to hold an inmate in unsafe conditions.
141. Id. The Court of Appeals found defendants were implementing racially discriminatory practices; that the prison's conditions which deprived inmates of basic hygiene, adequate medical treatment, conditions of solitary confinement, and the prison's failure to
provide sufficient protection against physical assaults by inmates constituted cruel and
unusual punishment; and that the practice of censoring all incoming and outgoing mail was
unconstitutional. Id.
142. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
143. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
144. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
145. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04, 105-06.
146. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
147. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299. Whether characterizing the treatment received by the
inmate, the conditions of confinement, or the failure to adequately address medical needs,
the appropriate review entails application of the deliberate indifference standard opined in
Estelle. Id. at 297.
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ling v. McKinney, 148 a prisoner brought an Eighth Amendment
challenge based upon possible future harm to him by exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS"). 149 The Court required
McKinney to prove both the subjective and objective elements necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment violation. 150 The objective factor would only be proved if McKinney showed that he was
personally at risk, due to an exposure to extraordinarily high ETS
levels. 151 Furthermore, this objective factor "requires a court to
assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk."152 The Court
considered legislation enacted by the country's legislatures as the
best evidence of these evolving standards. 53 Additionally, the
Court required McKinney to satisfy the subjective factor by showing that the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to
54
the prisoners' well-being.
In Farmer v. Brennan,155 a transsexual prisoner brought a suit
alleging that, by placing him in the general prison population, the
56
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his safety.
In this case, the Court further refined the definition of deliberate
indifference and predicated a prison official's liability, under the
Eighth Amendment analysis, only upon those officials who knowingly disregarded a substantial risk to the prisoner's safety or
health. 57 Additionally, the official must have cognizance of the
fact that the potential risk of serious harm exists, and he must
conclusively form that supposition. 158 The Court asserted that the
"subjective recklessness" standard developed in criminal law was
both a recognizable and workable standard and endorsed it as the
159
test for "deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

509 U.S. 25 (1993).
Helling, 509 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Farmer,511 U.S. at 829-30.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 839-40.
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V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The procedural due process limitation on the death penalty was
discussed in Furman v. Georgia,160 where the Court first asserted
that death is a peculiarly extreme penalty in its irrevocability and
rankness, and therefore required heightened safeguards. 16' Moreover, the Court opined that the legislatures, rather than the
courts, were best constituted to respond to the will and moral values of the people in a democratic society. 62 The Justices could not
overrule a class of penalties merely because the judiciary deemed
lesser forms of discipline sufficient to meet penological needs. 63
The Court concluded, however, that the penalty of death may not
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner but can be met by
a carefully drafted statute that ensures sufficient information and
guidance is given to the sentencing authority.164
In Gregg v. Georgia, 65 the Court noted that, in the United
States, the mandate of execution for the conviction of murder was
a traditional penalty. 166 Also, it was evident from the text of the
Constitution that capital punishment was adopted by the Framers. 167 Moreover, the simultaneous ratification of the Fifth
Amendment excogitated this punitory interdiction. 168 Finally, the
Fourteenth Amendment-affirmed some seventy-five years laterprovided that "no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."' 69 The Court also commented that the states' legislative reaction to Furman was the
most conspicuous attestation of society's endorsement of capital
170
punishment.
160. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
161. Furman,408 U.S. at 287-89.
162. Id. at 383. 'The paucity of judicial decisions invalidating legislatively prescribed
punishments is powerful evidence that in this country legislatures have in fact been responsive-albeit belatedly at times-to changes in social attitudes and moral values." Id at
384.
163. Id at 451.
164. Id at 249-257.
165. 428 U.S. 153 (1972).
166. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-77.
167. Id. at 177. The First Congress of the United States enacted legislation authorizing
the death penalty for specific crimes. See 1 STAT. 112 (1790).
168. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177. The Fifth Amendment imposed certain limitations on the
prosecution of capital cases: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... ;nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; ...nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." Id.
169. Id.
170. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
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In the present case, essentially three standards of review were
articulated by the Justices. First, the plurality held that a method
of execution would violate the Eighth Amendment if it posed an
"objectively intolerable risk" that could be significantly reduced by
adopting readily available alternative procedures. 171 Second, Justice Thomas opined that a method of execution violated the Eighth
172
Amendment only if it was "deliberately designed to inflict pain."'
Third, Justice Ginsberg asserted that any "untoward risk" to the
73
condemned would be violative of the Eighth Amendment. 1
While Chief Justice Roberts believed that the plurality's standard would prevent future litigation, let us closely examine those
variables: What is an objectively intolerable risk? What is severe
pain? What is a significant reduction? What is readily available?
By adopting this loosely defined standard for method of execution
cases, the Court has blurred the conventional rule that once defined the parameters of cruel and unusual punishment. Ambiguity breeds litigation.
Traditionally, the death penalty was "considered to be cruel and
unusual punishment under the Federal Constitution when the
procedure for execution creates a substantial risk of wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or lingering death."'1 74 This
tradition is the bright-line test articulated by Justice Thomas, and
that test appears to be the most pragmatic, consistent, and reproducible strategy for analyzing a method-of-execution case. Was
there a wanton and willful infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering? If the answer is no, the Eighth Amendment requirements
should be satisfied.
During oral arguments for this case, Justice Scalia offered this
query: if the state is not using the least painful way to execute an
inmate, is the state thereby inflicting unnecessary pain? 175 However, the Eighth Amendment's concern is with unnecessarily cruel
punishment-the intentional infliction of pain (unnecessary and
wanton)-not suffering incidentally necessary to carry out the
176
death sentence.
If Justice Ginsberg's definition were adopted, the Court would
become embroiled in the micromanagement of the states' methods
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1537.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1572.
Baze I, 217 S.W.3d at 209-210 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Baze II, 553 U.S. _ (No. 07-5439).
Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1559-60.
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of execution. Inmates would continually argue that their executions could be made a little safer by implementing an additional
step here or there, such as stroking the eyelashes or pinching the
inmates' arms to ascertain their levels of consciousness. Protocols
would simply have no endpoint. Adoption of this standard would
create another moratorium on capital punishment.
Petitioners alleged that numerous problems with Kentucky's lethal injection protocol existed. 177 Each assertion was dismissed by
the Court. 178 In reviewing the protocol, Kentucky had implemented several measures to minimize the inmate's risk of pain
and suffering. The protocol mandated the involvement of experienced personnel, frequent practice sessions, redundant IV access,
observation of the condemned by the warden, and an alternative
plan if the inmate did not lose consciousness within sixty seconds
179
of administration of the thiopental.
As a physician, I believe that the most crucial aspect of the lethal injection protocol is the initiation of a fully functioning IV
site. This process usually involves placing a tourniquet around
the subject's arm to permit venous engorgement.'8 0 The site chosen for access is usually in the hand, forearm, or near the antecubital fossa,' 8 1 though an area in the leg or foot could be used as an
alternative in patients who have sclerosed 8 2 veins, such as in
some intravenous drug abusers. Once the vein is observed or pal177. Id. at 1533.
178. Id. at 1533-34.
179. Id. at 1534.
180. Editor's Note: "Engorgement," as defined by Stedman's Online Medical Dictionary,
means "[d]istention with fluid or other material." Stedman's Online Medical Dictionary,
http://www.stedmans.comi (last visited April 26, 2009). Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary defines "engorgement" as "to fill with blood to the point of congestion." MerriamWebster
Medical
Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgibinlmwmednlm?book=Medical&va=Engorgement (last visited May 1, 2009). When blood
backs up in the vein, the vein becomes more noticeable by sight and palpable by touch.
181. Editor's Note: The "antecubital fossa," as defined by Stedman's Online Medical
Dictionary, means "[i]n front of the elbow." Stedman's Online Medical Dictionary,
http://www.stedmans.com/ (last visited April 26, 2009). Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary defines "antecubital fossa" as "a triangular cavity of the elbow that contains a tendon of
the biceps, the median nerve, and the brachial artery." Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgibinmwmednlm?book=Medical&va=antecubital%20fossa (last visited April 26, 2009).
182. Editor's Note: "Sclerosis," as defined by Stedman's Online Medical Dictionary,
means "induration" or "(tlhe process of becoming extremely firm or hard, or having such
physical features ." Stedman's Online Medical Dictionary, http://www.stedmans.com/ (last
visited May 1, 2009). Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary defines "sclerosis" as "a pathological condition in which a tissue has become hard and which is produced by overgrowth of
fibrous tissue and other changes (as in arteriosclerosis) or by increase in interstitial tissue
and other changes (as in multiple sclerosis)." Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm (last visited April 26, 2009).
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pated, and the area prepped, the IV needle is inserted into the
vein and a flashback of blood is noted in the plastic catheter. The
needle is then withdrawn while the catheter is simultaneously
threaded into the vein. A rubber-tipped cap is secured onto the
catheter, and the tourniquet is released. Subsequently, the catheter is flushed with a syringe of saline to ensure correct placement.
While this flushing occurs, the site is carefully observed for swelling, which, if present, would indicate that the IV has infiltrated
(lost function). If, however, the saline flush flows freely, without
resistance and or noticeable swelling, the IV is presumed to be
open and unobstructed. The catheter then will be secured in its
present place and attached to an IV line. A layman could easily
recognize any swelling. Careful observation of this IV site by the
warden and deputy warden at the time of thiopental injection into
the inmate is, in my medical opinion, within'their capabilities and
the most important safeguard in Kentucky's lethal injection protocol to ensure adequate administration of the drug and proper sedation of the condemned prior to instilling paralysis with the Pavulon.
Alternatively, petitioners argued that Kentucky should adopt a
single barbiturate drug protocol even though no other state has
implemented one.1 8 3 They noted that paralytics are forbidden to
be used for euthanizing animals in veterinary practice, while such
single drug protocols are used routinely in that field.18 4 However,
other methods approved by veterinarians for euthanasia include
pithing, exsanguination, stunning the animal or using a captive
bolt to penetrate the skull. 185 Clearly, these methods indicate that
veterinary practice standards for animals should not be extrapolated to humans. 8 6 Interestingly, some of the data from the Netherlands study on euthanasia suggested that it was very difficult to
euthanize patients using a single "lethal" dose of barbiturate, with
several of these patients reportedly waking up from their barbiturate-induced coma.187
Furthermore, in its 2000 Report on Euthanasia, a panel of the
American Veterinary Medical Association ("AVMA") condemned
the use of neuromuscular blockers by themselves as a method for
183. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1534-35.
184. Id. at 1535.
185. 2000 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia, 218 J. AM. VETERINARY ASS'N 669,
681 (Mar. 1, 2001).
186. Baze I1,
128 S. Ct. at 1536.
187. Id. at 1541.
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euthanizing animals. 8 8 Additionally, the updated June 2007
AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia advised several cautions.18 9 Neither report ever evaluated pancuronium bromide or Pavulon, the
paralyzing agent used in human lethal injection. 190 In regards to
neuromuscular blocking agents, the revised fourth appendix of the
guidelines, entitled "Some unacceptable agents and methods of
euthanasia," had identical language to the 2000 report. 191 The
chief mischaracterization came from the body of the guidelines 192
in a comment under the heading of PentobarbitalCombinationsreferring to a single product made up of more than one type of
drug. Here, the guidelines stated, "a combination of pentobarbital
with a neuromuscular blocking agent is not an acceptable euthanasia agent."193 This combination described a very different set of
circumstances. When a single syringe delivers intravenously both
the barbiturate and the paralytic simultaneously, it is theoretically possible that the animal (or person) could become paralyzed
prior to becoming fully anesthetized and unconscious, which would
result in the awareness of suffocation and extreme pain. Death
penalty opponents have seized upon this ambiguous language to
decry lethal injection protocols. They believed that states were

188. 2000 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia, 218 J. AM. VETERINARY ASS'N 669,
681 (Mar. 1, 2001). The agents listed in Appendix 4 included nicotine, magnesium sulfate,
potassiumchloride [sic], and all curariform agents. The recommendations of this report
were mischaracterized in Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1071 (Ca. 2005). Also, in
the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal article of February 2006 entitled "Use of the
Drug Pavulon in Lethal Injections: Cruel and Unusual?" where the article attributed the
following information to the 2000 AVMA report: when used alone or in combination with
sodium pentobarbital,neuromuscular blocking agents - a category that includes pavulon "cause respiratoryarrest before loss of consciousness, so the animal may perceive pain and
distress after it is immobilized." 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1184 (2005-2006). This
statement does not reflect the actual wording of the cite, Appendix 4. Pavulon is not specifically mentioned in the report. 2000 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia. The body
of the report reads, "A combination of pentobarbital with a neuromuscular blocking agent is
not an acceptable euthanasia agent." Id. at 680.
189. AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia, (Formerly Report of the AVMA Panel of Euthanasia), June 2007. The AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia have been widely misinterpreted.
Id. Please note the following: "The guidelines are in no way intended to be used for human
lethal injection." Id. "The applications of a barbiturate, paralyzing agent, and potassium
chloride delivered in separate syringes or stages (the common method used for human lethal
injection) is not cited in this report. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Supra notes 188 and 189. Both appendices state, "When used alone, these drugs all
cause respiratory arrest before loss of consciousness, so the animal may perceive pain and
distress after it is immobilized." Id. (emphasis added).
192. Supra note 188.
193. Id.
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executing humans in violation of the AVMA policy guidelines for
euthanizing animals. 194 This belief was simply incorrect.
Notably during oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts opined
that appearance equated with dignity for the three-drug protocol-if a single drug protocol was mandated, then future litigants
would argue that an inmate must be forced to die an undignified
death, referring to the Netherlands study where there were reports of myoclonus (involuntary jerking movements) and vomiting
in some patients who did not receive the paralytic. 195 Summarizing the petitioners' argument, the Supreme Court noted that petitioners asked the Court to invalidate a method of execution that
all parties agreed would be entirely pain-free when followed correctly and to order the Commonwealth of Kentucky to adopt a
method of lethal injection protocol that had never been used in
any execution and that is inconsistent with the laws and practice
in every death penalty jurisdiction in the United States. 196 In this
sense, the correct decision was made, but I believe that the wrong
standard of review was adopted.
Additionally, the opinion by Justice Stevens deserves some
comment. He asserted that capital punishment serves no legitimate penological purpose and recommended that the death penalty be declared unconstitutional. 1 97 Justice Scalia appropriately
described this remark as the clearest example of "rule by judicial
fiat."'198 Capital punishment is a decision best left to the legislatures, not the judiciary. Consider the response to Furman, where
the majority of states rewrote their death penalty statutes to comply with the arbitrary-or-capricious standard articulated by the
Court. 199 How could a non-elected Justice have the audacity to
presume to know more than the legislatures, the will of the people, or a plain textual reading of the Constitution?
Moreover, some polls show that seventy percent or more of peo20 0
ple favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.
Assuming these results are somewhat credible, the capital punishment issue illustrates an important exercise in the way the
194. Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Ca. 2005).
195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Baze II, 553 U.S. - (No. 07-5439).
196. Baze II, 128 S. Ct. at 1535, 1537.
197. Id. at 1551.
198. Id. at 1555.
199. Id. at 1552-53.
200. Alex Kozinski, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4
(1995-96) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2000-01 (1993)).
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Constitution can hinder the will of the majority. 201 There is currently a determined minority of the population who choose to effectively challenge the majority's resolution of the capital punishment issue, primarily based upon moral grounds. 202 This situation
leaves the death penalty in a nebulous state.
In an effort to identify the costs associated with death penalty
cases, the ACLU of Northern California obtained documents relating to reimbursements to smaller counties for homicide trials from
1996 through 2005.203 The three most expensive cases were the
Charles Ng trial ($10.9 million),20 4 the Donald Bowcutt case ($5
million), 20 5 and the Scott Peterson trial ($3.2 million).20 6 From
1988 through 1994, approximately 25% of all the rulings by the
Supreme Court of California involved death penalty issues. 20 7 Yet,
20 8
since 1976, California has executed only 13 inmates.
These consequences amount to the worst possible scenario.
Though the Supreme Court already demands that the federal government and the states antithesize amongst the caliber of convicted murderers who merit the death penalty and those who do
not, such dictates have been arduously realized. 20 9 Moreover, the
average lapse time between sentencing and execution in the
United States has grown steadily from 4.25 years during a period
of 1977 to 1983, to an average of 12.75 years in 2007.210 In Cali-

201. Id. at 28.
202. Id at 21, 28. "Killing human beings is an act so awesome, so destructive, so irremediable that no killer can be looked upon with anything but horror, even when that killer is
the state." Id. (citing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE 175 n.1 (1982)).
203. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT,
129 (June 30, 2008), www.ccfaj.org.
204. Id. The Ng trial costs included $1.24 million for court expenses, $2.2 million for
prosecution expenses, and $6.42 million for defense expenses. Id.
205. Id. The Bowcutt reimbursement was an advance payment of $5 million for the
anticipated costs. Id. Actual costs were not documented. Id.
206. Id. The Peterson trial reimbursement included $1.4 million for prosecution expenses and $1.4 million to the City of Modesto for their police expenses. Id. Defense expenses were not reimbursed because Peterson had retained counsel. Id.
207. Kozinski, supra note 200, at 7 (citing Gerald F. Uelman, The Lucas Court's Seventh
Year: Achieving a Balanced Menu, L.A. DAILY J., June 8, 1994, at 8 tbl.1).
208. Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited
April 21, 2009).
209. Kozinski, supra note 199, at 30. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 358-59
(1988) (imposing the death penalty after determining that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating factors) and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 426 (1980), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982) (imposing the death penalty after specifying that the aggravating factors were "outrageously or wanton vile, horrible and inhuman.').
210. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 208.
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fornia, that average is currently 17.2 years. 211 A recent study by
Senior Judge Arthur Alarcon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit described the significant periods of delay that account for California exceeding the national average.21 2 They include appointing counsel to handle the direct appeal; 3 to 5 years,
scheduling the hearing after the submission of all briefs; 2 years,
appointing counsel for the state habeas corpus petition; 8-10
years, and awaiting final decisions in federal habeas corpus peti21 3
tions; 6 years.
Due to these tremendous financial commitments and time constraints, the pro-death-penalty majority must come to the realization that, as a society, we may be capable of carrying out fifty executions a year, but we cannot do several hundred. 2 14 Once that
notion is countenance, subsequent procedures should establish
21 5
where and how we should dedicate our prosecutorial assets.
Obviously, there is no clear solution, but one suggested approach
would focus state resources on the most heinous of murderers,
21 6
such as assassins, terrorists, or serial killers.
Moreover, Justice Stevens too readily dismissed some of the literature that tended to show that capital punishment has a deterrence factor. For example, a well-known analysis proposed that
21 7 If
every execution may avert a median of eighteen murders.
this data is accurate, based upon consequentialist theories of punishment, the death penalty is actually morally obligatory; 21 8 this

211.

CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT,

122 (June 30, 2008), www.ccfaj.org. Lead counsel must have ten years of criminal litigation
experience, including at least two murder cases tried to conclusion. Id. Associate counsel
must have three years of criminal litigation experience, including three serious felony cases
tried to conclusion. Id.
212. Id. at 122 (citing Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California'sDeath Row Deadlock,
80 S. CAL .L. REV. 697 (2007)).
213. Id. at 122-23.
214. Kozinski, supra 200, at 30.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 31.
217. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, And
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005-06) (citing Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Does
Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmortorium Panel
Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003)). See also Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence
Redux: Science, Law and CausalReasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
255 (2006) (citing H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj. Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted
Sentences and the DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003)).
218. Sunstein, supra note 217, at 706-07. Consequentialism is a theory asserting that
actions are right or wrong according to their balanced good or bad consequences. TOM AND
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, 340-41 (5th ed. 2001). The "right" act in
any set of circumstances is the one that produces the greatest overall result, as determined
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notion of morality is based on the assumption that capital punishment counts as an action by the state, while the refusal to im219
pose it counts as an omission.
Between 1972 and 1976, the Supreme Court effectively produced a moratorium on the death penalty. 220 Using state-level
data from 1977 to 1999, researchers made before-and-after comparisons on the murder rate in each state before and after the
death penalty was suspended and reinstated. 2 21 The data indicate
that murder rates increased immediately after the moratorium
and decreased immediately after the moratorium was suspended. 222 It is possible that capital punishment saves lives, even
if it has no deterrent effect. It may do so by incapacitating people
who would otherwise kill again, either in prison or in the commu223
nity after parole.
Conversely, from a deontologist's perspective, the statesanctioned death penalty is morally wrong and that wrongfulness
is not dependent on any actions that produce a net benefit to society. 22 4 This perspective condemns the active imposition of statesponsored capital punishment but not passive inaction. 225 Some
theorists argue that capital punishment is justified only if and
when a rational policy assessment would demonstrate that no alternative approaches could do as much to diminish murder
rates. 226 This construct is analogous to a strict scrutiny standard,
but the Supreme Court has not embraced it as a matter of constitutional law. 22 7 Certainly, the relationship-if one actually exists-between deterrence and the death penalty is multifaceted
and may deserve further exploration.

from an objective perspective that gives equal weight to the interests of all the affected
parties. Id.
219. Sunstein, supra note 217, at 727.
220. Id. at 712.
221. Id. at 711-12 (citing Dezhbakhsh, supra note 211, at 3-4).
222. Id. at 712.
223. Id. at 715-16.
224. Sunstein, supra note 217, at 718. Deontology is often referred to as Kantian because it is largely based upon the works of Immanuel Kant. Tom, supra note 218, at 352.
He argued that certain actions are impermissible regardless of the consequences. Id.
225. Id. at 719.
226. Id. at 732.
227. Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 175). "History teaches that the independence of the
judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social
pressures." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
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Since our country's founding, inmates have been executed by
hanging, firing squad, the gas chamber, and electrocution. Surely
lethal injection is the most humane technique currently available
for accomplishing a mandated execution. However, it is conceivably rational to argue that, as a society, we have evolved to the
point where we no longer feel compelled to execute our citizens,
even when they commit horrendous crimes. And if that is the
case, then juries should find for the alternative punishment of life
in prison. But the goal of eliminating the death penalty, however
noble, could be more effectively accomplished by efforts aimed at
changing the consensus of American society rather than constantly demanding the courts to rule on innumerable trite legal
arguments and languid constitutional technicalities.

